Marwin Mönkemeyer

This paper examines how institutional investors exchange private information through co-shareholding networks and the implications for corporate acquisition outcomes. Using New York City taxi data, we identify face-to-face interactions among investor pairs and document that co-blockholders are more likely to seek on-site meetings, consistent with an increased exchange of information. Given evidence for an information channel, we construct the broader blockholder network between US institutional investors and show that acquirers held by more centrally positioned institutional investors earn higher announcement returns. The valuation effect is strongest when targets are more opaque and private information is more valuable. Consistent with an advisory channel, the effect only exits among investors with a comparative advantage in exploiting information, and facilitates “hidden gem” acquisitions rather than preventing poor deals. Overall, our findings suggest that co-shareholding networks promote private information flows that translate into superior advice and enhance M&A performance.

We study the role of social trust in the equity allocation decisions of global investors using a large sample of institutionally managed portfolios of 8,088 investors from 33 countries over the 2000 through 2017 period. The negative relationship between social trust and foreign bias suggests that institutional investors from high-social trust countries are less prone to underinvesting in foreign equity. Our results provide credence to an information-based explanation, indicating that social trust reduces foreign bias by compensating for the lack of information about foreign stock markets. Moreover, the effect of social trust on foreign bias is stronger if host-country institutions are weak, while it vanishes when the host country is characterized by strong institutions. The informal institution of social trust compensates for the lack of well-functioning formal country-level institutions in international portfolio decisions. Finally, the allocation effect resulting from social trust is different from “blind” trust. The portfolios of high-trust investors exhibit higher cross-country diversification and an enhanced portfolio risk-return trade-off.

We examine 17,207 U.S. mergers and acquisitions by public firms over the 1980–2019 period and find that the acquirer abnormal announcement returns are higher for firms held by more central investors in the network of active institutional blockholdings. This finding is robust to firm and deal characteristics, and it also extends to alternative network and return measures. To provide evidence on causality, we exploit extreme industry returns that lead to plausibly exogenous variation in investors’ monitoring ability. The positive effect of blockholder centrality on acquirer abnormal announcement returns only exists in information-sensitive (i.e., private) deals and only among institutions that have a comparative advantage in exploiting monitoring information. Our findings suggests that institutional investors obtain an information advantage through the network, which increases their monitoring ability.

Analyzing a large sample of U.S. firms over the 1990–2019 period, we show that firms with more central institutional investors in the equity holdings network engage less in accrual-based earnings management. This finding is robust to controlling for clique and common ownership, using alternative network and earnings properties, and extends to real earnings management. We establish causality using exogenous variation in network centrality and investor attention. The effect is most pronounced for institutions with a comparative advantage in exploiting monitoring information. Overall, our results suggest that central institutional investors gain an information advantage through access to the network’s resources, increasing their monitoring ability.

This study explores the link between investor heterogeneity represented on venture boards and firms' post-seed funding performance. We document a statistically and economically significant negative association of investor heterogeneity on both a firm's likelihood of obtaining new funding and the volume raised in new funding rounds. This suggest that investor heterogeneity decreases venture board efficacy and the quality of venture governance. The marginal impact of investor heterogeneity is non-linear and diminishing across a venture's funding life cycle. Our results remain robust after controlling for endogeneity issues and for alternative measures of investor culture.

I examine the value consequences of biodiversity incidents and their association with institutional ownership. Markets react negatively, with average shareholder losses ranging from $76 million to $344 million per incident. Additional stock price declines around subsequent earnings announcements are consistent with market underreaction. Institutional ownership is negatively associated with incident occurrence. Using plausibly exogenous shocks to monitoring intensity, I distinguish monitoring from selection effects. Long-term and domestic institutions, especially insurance firms and public pension funds, reduce incidents through active monitoring, whereas short-term and foreign investors, particularly investment advisors, exhibit selection behavior. Evidence from shareholder proposals supports a governance-via-voice mechanism, with withdrawn biodiversity-related proposals associated with lower incident re-occurrence. Finally, incidents are positively associated with the cost of equity capital, suggesting that investors demand compensation for biodiversity risk exposure.